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NOTE
"Electronic Fingerprints": Doing Away with the
Conception of Computer-Generated
Records as Hearsay
Adam Wolfson

*

INTRODUCTION
"Every statement has a dual nature, it is both a fact and the assertion of
fact, and on the guise in which it appears depends whether it is original evi
dence or hearsay, the respectable Dr. Jekyll is received with a becoming
respect, but the disrespectable Mr. Hyde is kicked ignominiously out of
1
court."
One night, in the hours just before daybreak, the computer servers at
Acme Corporation's headquarters quietly hum in the silence of the office's
darkened hallways. Suddenly, they waken to life and begin haphazardly sift
ing through their files. Several states away, a hacker sits in his room,
searching through the mainframe via an internet connection. His attack is
quick-lasting only a short five minutes-but the evidence of invasion is
apparent to Acme's IT employees when they come in to work the next
morning.
Nearly a year later, federal prosecutors bring suit in the federal district
court against the person they believe to be the hacker. During the trial, sev
eral witnesses testify about the attack and its resulting damage. The only
piece missing is the hacker's identity. In order to prove this, the prosecution
wishes to introduce the mainframe's records of the attack, which document
both the source of the invasion and the signature of the computer that con
ducted the entire event. A cursory check by computer specialists matched
these records with the accused hacker's personal computer.
The prosecutors lay sufficient foundation to authenticate the records and
then move to have them admitted into evidence.
"Objection!" states the defense counsel.
"On what grounds?" replies the judge.
"Hearsay, your Honor. The computer records the prosecution is attempting
to introduce do not satisfy the business records exception under Federal Rule
of Evidence 803 (6). They were created in response to an attack, and were not
maintained in the ordinary course of business. Consequently, they cannot be
admitted under the Rules of Evidence and must be deemed inadmissible."
*

J.D. candidate, December 2005, University of Michigan Law School. Special thanks to Pro
fessor Orin Kerr of George Washington University Law School for both help on the topic idea of this
Note as well as his continuing input on its development throughout the writing process.
I.

J.B.C. TREGARTHEN, THE LAW OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE 10-11 (1915).

151

152

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 104:151

The judge directs his attention to the prosecution.
"Counsel, are there any other exceptions these records fall under?"
"No, your Honor."
"Objection sustained."
This result may seem inequitable, but it is entirely possible given the
current majority view on the nature of computer-generated records.
In order to understand this conception, it is important to first lay out
what constitutes hearsay, the rationale for the rule, and the exceptions for
computer-generated records. Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence
to prove the truth of the matter asserted."2 At its heart, the hearsay rule
3
merely aims to exclude unreliable evidence at trial. This "unreliability" is
considered to be a product of several factors: (1) hearsay evidence is often
not the best evidence of a fact because more direct statements or other evi
dence have far more probative value; (2) a hearsay statement is almost never
made under oath; (3) other parties do not have a chance to cross-examine
the maker of a hearsay statement; and (4) with a hearsay statement, the
judge and jury do not get an opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
4
declarant for credibility purposes.
American courts do not admit hearsay because it generally creates an
unreliable "chain of inferences" that is unacceptable when the aim of a trial
5
is accurate fact finding. Most inaccuracies are the result of "the four testi
monial infirmities of ambiguity, insincerity, faulty perception, and erroneous
memory."6 Another danger hearsay raises is that it allows juries to take the
statement in question out of context, which can completely change the

2.
FED. R. Evrn. 801(c). A "statement" is "(I) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal con
duct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion." FED. R. Evrn. 80I(a). A "declarant" is "a
person who makes a statement." FED. R. Evm. 801(b).
3.
See Lilly V. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 131 (1999); IRVING YOUNGER, HEARSAY: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE THROUGH THE THICKET 201 (1988) (stating that hearsay is only a rule against unreliable evi
dence); G. MICHAEL FENNER, THE HEARSAY RULE 4-5 (2003) ("Underneath it all, truth is the objective
of the hearsay rule: The hearsay rule is about keeping out evidence that is so unreliable that it does not
help us find the truth.").
4.
ANDREW L.-T. CHOO, HEARSAY AND CONFRONTATION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 11-13 {1996).
These four factors are applicable in a variety of ways, each having more weight than the others depend
ing on the case. Factors {I), (2) and (3) are the historical rationales for the rule. Id. at 11. Factor (4) has
only recently risen to prominence as an accepted reason for upholding the rule as a whole. Id.
5.
Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REv. 957, 958 (1974). Tribe's analy
sis parallels that of CHOO, supra note 4, but goes a step further in describing the fallacies of eyewitness
testimony in general. Tribe, supra, at 957-61. This, along with a triangular graph included in the article,
helps to create a "heuristic device" for understanding the problems associated with admitting hearsay
statements into evidence. Id.
6.
Tribe, supra note 5, at 958. These four infirmities refer to the general problems with any set
of in-court testimony. "Ambiguity" refers to statements that need clarification and can be misconstrued
on a subsequent retelling. CHOO, supra note 4, at 84. "Insincerity," as the label implies, is the "deliberate
lies" some declarants tell in order to alter others' perceptions of the facts. Id. "Faulty perception" and
"erroneous memory" are both phenomena that occur as a matter of course in eyewitness testimony. Id.
For further discussion of these "hearsay dangers," please see CHOO, supra note 4.
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7
character of the assertion. Because in-court analysis of testimony largely
8
remedies these infirmities, we rightfully exclude hearsay evidence.
With this logic in mind, it is clear why assertive documents and most
types of records are textbook examples of hearsay. After all, a "statement"
9
does not always have to be oral. If the document is introduced because its
proponent claims that the information contained therein is true, it is the
written equivalent of an oral assertion and must therefore meet a valid
IO
hearsay exception.
When introducing computer-generated documents, lawyers most com
11
monly use the business records exception. An extension of the historical
12
"shopbook rule," this exception was a response to the advent of the cor
porate form, which created a heretofore unseen phenomenon: a trial where
13
no physical person was being sued. Since testimony of the corporation's
inner workings necessarily incorporated voluminous business records,
courts battled with the problem of a rigid hearsay rule that had no true on
5
point exceptions. 14 In 1936, the Commonwealth Fund Act1 offered the first
6
1
codification of the business records exception. The Act's proponents ar
gued that unaltered business records were unusually reliable because
17
businesses themselves rely on these records for day-to-day operations.
•

7.

Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 598 (1994).

8.

See Tribe, supra note 5, at 960-{51.

9.

FED. R. Evm. 80l(a).

10. Id.; FENNER, supra note 3, at 10 (stating that conduct may be a "statement" if the actor in
tends it to be such).
11.

FED. R. Evrn. 803(6); Ronald J. Marzullo-La Russa, Computer-Generated Evidence: Admis

sibility, 20 REv. JUR. U.P.R. 121, 129 (1985).

12.
RICHARD 0. LEMPERT ET AL., A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, TRAN
SCRIPTS AND CASES 603 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter LEMPERT ET AL.]. According to LEMPERT ET AL.,

[T]he "shopbook rule" is rooted in the early English custom that allowed a merchant doing business
on account to enter his books into evidence to prove the defendant owed him money.

To ensure reliability, different jurisdictions required one or more of the following guarantees: (1) a
"supplemental oath" taken by the merchant as to the justness of his accounts, (2) inspection by the
court to determine if the books were fairly kept in the regular course of business, (3) testimony that
the merchant kept honest books, and (4) proof apart from the books that at least some portion of the
goods charged to an account had been actually delivered.
Id.; see also JoHN w. STRONG, 2 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE§ 285, at 249-50 (5th ed. 1999) [hereinafter

McCORMICK].
See YOUNGER, supra note 3, at 111-13 (discussing the effect of the Industrial Revolution and
13.
increased need for business records on evidentiary necessities and rules).

14.

Id.

15.

Federal Business Records (Commonwealth Fund) Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (2000).

16.

FED. R. Evrn. 803 advisory committee's note.

17. Id.; see also, e.g., United States v. Snyder, 787 F.2d 1429, 1433--34 (10th Cir. 1986) ('The
business records exception is based on a presumption of accuracy, accorded because the infonnation is
part of a regularly conducted activity, kept by those trained in the habits of precision, and customarily
checked for correctness, and because of the accuracy demanded in the conduct of the nation's business.").
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Congress, commentators; and courts agreed with this rationale's persua.
19
18
and the A ct passe d w1"th mmor controversy.

s1veness,
•

The modern version of the exception deems a "memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation" admissible if it is "kept in the course of a
21
20
regularly conducted business activity." This is a very broad rule because
the term "business" includes any "business, institution, association, pro
fession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted
22
for profit." Examples of this broadness in practice include courts admit
23
ting as "business records" a blackjack dealer's tip log and calendar
24
notations of daily illegal drug sales.
The other major exception under which computer records are admitted
25
is the public records exception. Under this exception, records must origi
26
nate from "public offices or agencies" and set forth ( 1) the activities of
the office,

(2) matters

observed· as part of office employees' jobs, or
27

(3) factual findings resulting from an investigation conducted by the office.

This exception is predicated on the belief that (1) public records are just as
trustworthy as business records because the government relies on them for
proper functioning,

(2) public

employees usually record their activities prop

erly, and (3) government employees are unlikely to remember details
28
independent of the record. Foundation of the records' admissibility, as with
18.

FED. R. Evrn.803 advisory committee's note.

19.

Id.

20. FED. R. Evm. 803(6).Courts have long held computer records admissible as business re
cords, given the proper foundation. See, e.g., United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 452 (6thCir. 2001)
(requiring that computer records satisfy the business records exception); Hardison v. Balboa Ins. Co., 4
Fed. Appx. 663, 669 (10thCir. 2001) (stating that computer records need to be verified pursuant to Fed
eral Rule of Evidence ("FRE") 901); United States v. Moore, 923 F.2d 910, 914 (1stCir. 1991) (holding
that part of computer records introduced at trial were business records); United States v. Miller, 771 F.2d
1219, 1237 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that computer records must satisfy the business records exception
before being admitted); United States v. Glasser, 773 F.2d 1553, 1559 (I IthCir. 1985) (setting the situa
tions in which computer records may be admitted as business records); Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer
Co., 542 F.2d 111, 125 (2d Cir. 1976) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting) (explaining that the business
records exception is legitimately applied to computer evidence). The foundation is laid when the party
seeking to admit the records (1) introduces evidence that the computer program is sufficiently accurate
for reliability purposes, and (2) establishes that the business relied on the records for day-to-day opera
tions. Salgado, 250 F.3d at 453. The party need not provide expert testimony as to the mechanical
accuracy of the program. Id. Instead, proper foundation and a witness on the stand who is a legitimate
representative of the business and is familiar with the business' recordkeeping practices will suffice for
business records purposes. Id. at 451-52; Hardison, 4 Fed. Appx. at 669; Miller, 771 F.2d at 1237.
21.

2 McCORMICK, supra note 12,§ 288.

22.

2 ld.

23.

Keogh v.Comm'r oflntemal Revenue, 713 F.2d 496 (9thCir. 1983).

24.

United States v. Lizotte, 856 F.2d 341 (1stCir. 1988).

25.

FED. R. EVID 803(8); Marzullo-La Russa, supra note 11, at 130-31.

26.

FED. R. Evm 803(8).

27.

Id.

28. FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory committee's note. The logical extension of this rationale is that
public officials have an inordinately large number of records to maintain. It is nearly impossible to expect
them to remember what would normally be just another number or figure entered into the ledger.Conse-
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business records, may be established by a layperson representative of the gov29
emment agency.
A third conceivably applicable exception under which computer records
may be admitted is the "residual" provision found in Federal Rule of Evi
dence ("FRE") 807 if there are sufficient "circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness" and the piece of hearsay is offered as evidence of a material
30
fact without causing undue prejudice against the opposing party. A hearsay
proponent who employs this exception must give opposing parties "a fair op
31
portunity" to prepare for the evidence's inclusion in the record.
Unfortunately for parties who have no other recourse but FRE 807, this
"catch-all" exception is seldom employed because judges are uncomfortable
32
with its extremely powerful and flexible nature.
33
Almost all federal courts, and many state courts, regard all computer
34
records as hearsay that may only be admitted under the business records or
35
public records exceptions. These courts follow the dissent in Penna Re
search v. Singer Co., a 1976 Second Circuit decision that considered the

quently, courts are willing to trust public records because (I) there is a presumption towards trusting
government sans evidence to the contrruy, (2) public officials have little incentive to lie when keeping
their records, (3) these records are necessary for governmental functions and, as a result, are more likely
to be accurate, and (4) there are very few other ways that the records would be admitted even though they
have potentially high probative value. See id.
29.
See United States v. Miller, 771F.2d 1219, 1237 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that custodians of
computer records need not be intimately familiar with their programs in order to still offer proper founda
tion for the evidence).
30.

FED. R. Evm. 807.

31.

Id.

32.
See CHARLES B. GIBBONS, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE WITH TuiAL OBJECTIONS 129-35
(2003); Russo v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., No. CIV.A.94-195, 1998 WL 967568, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18,
1998) ("A catch-all rule such as Rule 807 must be sparingly invoked, lest its potential breadth swallow
the carefully crafted narrowness of the enumerated exceptions."). Of the major cases involving computer
records in federal courts, not one instance exists where such records were admitted under the residual
exception. The only case-state or federal-that discusses the relationship between computer records
and FRE 807, Russo, seems to suggest that computer records could legitimately be admitted under this
Rule, but only after the proponent party demonstrates the records in question possess a very high level of
trustworthiness. See id. at *3.
33.
United HealthCare Corp. v. Am. Trade Ins. Co., 88 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Pendergrass, 47 F.3d 1166 (4th Cir. 1995); Potamkin Cadillac Corp. v. B.R.I. Coverage
Corp., 38 F.3d 627 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Cestnik, 36 F.3d 904 (10th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Blackburn, 992 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Moore, 923 F.2d 910 (1st Cir.
1991); United States v. Spine, 945 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hutson, 821 F.2d 1015
(5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Miller, 771F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Glasser, 773
F.2d 1553 (I Ith Cir. 1985); United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United States
v. Liebert, 519F.2d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 1975). The only two federal cases that take the opposite view
are United States v. Rollins, No. ACM34515, 2004 WL 26780 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 24, 2003)
and United States v. Duncan, 30 M.J. 1284 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1990). The U.S. Supreme Court
has not addressed the issue.
34.

FED. R. Evm. 803(6). Computer-generated records introduced at trial are often printouts

which purport to show that a party called a certain telephone number or used a certain credit card.
See, e. g. , United States v. Salgado, 250F.3d 438, 452 (6th Cir. 2001).
35.

FED. R. Evm. 803(8). Federal courts have been quick to admit governmental computer

records under this Rule. See, e. g . , United States v. Spine, 945 F.2d 143, 149 (6th Cir. 1991).
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36

Noting various

hearsay sources Perma Research's experts relied upon in analyzing the
simulations' results and conclusions, Judge Van Graafeiland stated in his
dissent that he was "not prepared to accept the product of a computer as the
37
equivalent of the Holy Writ." Further, he argued that computers' "ability to
package hearsay and erroneous or misleading data in an extremely persua
sive format" required that computer evidence satisfy a hearsay exception in
38
order to be admitted. Judge Van Graafeiland's solution contained two ap
proaches: ( 1) for computer records submitted as business records, simply
use the business records exception; and (2) when a computer program is
used to produce information specifically for litigation, require the proponent
party to make the computer program in question available to the opposing
39
party before trial.
Notably absent in Judge Van Graafeiland's analysis is the possibility that
computer evidence might not represent human assertions and therefore not
constitute hearsay. The issue of computer-generated data, such as the IP log
at Acme Corp., was not addressed in the case. Considering Penna was de
cided in 1976, when personal computer technology was only beginning to
40
develop, it is likely that the court was not aware of such records.
Almost all federal courts and most state courts apply Judge Van
41
These

Graafeiland's analysis to all computer records, regardless of source.

courts are stuck in a hearsay rut; while they often rightly define the records
42
as computer-generated--or, at least use the words "computer-generated" the final logical step on why self-generated records are not hearsay is never
43
reached.

36. 542 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1976). The case revolved around a dispute regarding two contracts
for automotive anti-skid devices. One of the issues at trial was whether the devices performed prop
erly, and Penna Research introduced computer simulations that presumably showed that the devices
did not function well. On appeal, the Second Circuit reviewed the simulations and the experts them
selves.
37.

Id. at 121 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).

Id. at 126 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting) (quoting Jerome J. Roberts, A Practitioner's
Primer on Computer-Generated Evidence, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 254, 279 (1974)).

38.
39.

Id. at 125 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).

40.
Ken Poisson, Chronology of Personal Computers, at http://www.islandnet.com/
-kpolsson/comphist/ (last updated July 26, 2005).
41.

See cases cited supra note 33 and accompanying text.

42. United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 452 (6th Cir. 2001) (" [T]he admission of com
puter-generated toll and billing records made . . ."); United States v. Cestnik, 36 F.3d 904, 909 (10th
Cir. 1994) (" [T]he government introduced computer-generated Western Union money transfer re
cords."); United States v. Glasser, 773 F.2d 1553, 1559 (I Ith Cir. 1985) ("Computer generated
business records are admissible under the following circumstances . . . ") (list omitted); United States
v.Fusero, 106 F. Supp. 2d 921, 924 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (" As the Court stated during the trial . ..
computer-generated records . . . are admissible at trial pursuant to [FRE] 803(6). ").
43. See Cestnik, 36 F.3d at 909 (holding computer-generated records admissible because
they were used to show the amount and origin of fraudulent bank transfers and because they satis
fied the business records exception); United States v. Linn, 880 F.2d 209, 216 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The
record was generated automatically . . . as records of outgoing telephone calls regularly are . . . . In
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Applying the hearsay exceptions outlined above to computer records
means that business records generated in the regular course of business and
governmental agency computer records will almost always be admitted at
trial. Records that do not fit neatly into these categories, however, are left in
an uncertain void where, depending on a court's view of the matter, they
may be admitted or just as easily denied. 44 Fortunately, courts seem to im
plicitly recognize that many types of computer records should be allowed
into evidence, and often find some way to admit such data under another
.
45
hearsay except10n.
A minority of states employ a more nuanced view of computer records
6
and take a vastly different stance on such records' admissibility. 4 Impor
tantly, these states distinguish between computer-stored records and
47
computer-generated records, and maintain that computer-generated records
any event, telephone records are business records for the purposes of [FRE] 803(6)."); United States
v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219, 1237 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that computer-generated records are poten
tial hearsay because they constitute "writings"); United States v. Glasser, 773 F.2d 1553, 1559 (I Ith
Cir. 1985) (setting out the various situations where computer-generated records are admissible, all of
which are traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule); Fusero, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 924-25 (allowing
computer-generated records into the record because they were kept in the ordinary course of busi
ness).
44. An example of the danger posed by submitting computer records to a hearsay analysis is
found in United States v. Blackbum, 992 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1993). In that case, computer-generated
records denoting the prescription of a pair of glasses left at the scene of a crime were found to not
satisfy the business records exception because the records were compiled in preparation for litiga
tion. Id. at 670. While the records were eventually admitted under the residual hearsay exception
found in FED. R. Evm. 807, the fact that the court had to employ such a strained interpretation of the
hearsay rule and its exceptions demonstrates the danger of such a treatment for computer-generated
records.
45. See Molex, Inc. v. Wyler, No. 04 C 1715, 2005 WL 497812, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 17,
2005) (allowing email evidence under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule); In re
Homestore.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 347 F. Supp. 2d 769, 781 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that emails
written by a party are admissible as party admissions under the hearsay rule); United States v.
Boyce, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1082-83 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (holding computer-generated tax assess
ment forms created for litigation admissible under the public records exception to the hearsay rule);
State v. Love, 576 S.E.2d 709, 711-13 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (admitting computer printouts of a
witness's statement as recorded recollections).
46. See Orin S. Kerr, Computer Records and the Federal Rules of Evidence, U.S. Arr'vs'
BULL., March 2001, at 25 (outlining the overall countermovement in some states to view computer
generated records as a separate form of evidence). As of this Note's publication, these states are
California, e.g., People v. Hawkins, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627 (Ct. App. 2002), Illinois, e. g. , People v.
Holowko, 486 N.E.2d 877 (Ill. 1985), Kansas, e. g. , State v. Schuette, 44 P.3d 459 (Kan. 2002),
Louisiana, e. g., State v. Armstead, 432 So. 2d 837 (La. 1983), Mississippi, e. g., State v. Dunn, 7
S.W.3d 427 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999), Ohio, e. g . , Gray v. Fairview Gen. Hosp., No. 82318, 2004 WL
527936 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2004), Tennessee, e.g., State v. Meeks, 867 S.W.2d 361 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1993), and Texas, e. g. , Ly v. State, 908 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995). The only fed
eral courts that have not followed the majority stance are the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals,
United States v. Rollins, No. ACM34515, 2004 WL 26780 (AF. Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 24, 2003), and
the U. S. Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review, United States v. Duncan, 30 M.J. 1284,
1288 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1990).
47. See Hawkins, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642-43 (discussing various states' practices with re
gard to explicitly delineating between computer-stored and computer-generated records); Armstead,
432 So. 2d at 839-40 (setting out the terms "computer-stored" and "computer-generated" records
and noting that computer-stored data must satisfy the business records exception, but computer
generated data is not dependent on the observations of humans and, therefore, cannot be hearsay).
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cannot be hearsay because they are "not dependent upon the observations
48
and reporting of a human declarant." Computer-stored records, on the other
49
hand, are deemed the electronic equivalent of handwritten documents.
Since they are created or maintained by a human, they are considered state
ments and must therefore satisfy a hearsay exception in order to be
50
admitted. Ironically, the non-hearsay stance fits logically into the majority
of outcomes because it is the logic behind the hearsay rulings that is wrong,
not the usual result. Therefore, instead of overruling prior cases, these courts
simply need to recognize the distinction between computer-stored and com
puter-generated records.
This Note argues that the minority conception is the proper approach to
judging computer-generated records' admissibility. The minority approach
recognizes the true nature of this type of record and is in accordance with
the overall purposes of the Federal Rules of Evidence: accuracy and truth in
51
the fact-finding process. Part I demonstrates that a distinction exists be
tween computer-stored and computer-generated records. A majority of
courts largely ignore this distinction despite contravening precedent from
several state courts. Part II then explains why computer-generated records
as opposed to computer-stored records-should not be considered hearsay
because these records do not fit into the definition of hearsay and they do
not present the normal dangers associated with such statements. Part III ad
vocates a test by which judges can distinguish between these two types of
records. This Part also suggests ways in which federal and state judiciaries
can reform faulty precedent and avoid the likely obstacles that will arise in
such an endeavor.
I. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMPUTER-STORED AND
COMPUTER-GENERATED RECORDS AND

How IT Is

IGNORED IN VARIOUS COURTS

While the split on this issue is quite distinct, it is surprising that more ju
risdictions have not recognized or even addressed the possibility of different
types of computer records being introduced at trial. This Section argues that
there is an important distinction between various types of computer records
that must be recognized by courts if they wish to practice consistency in
applying the hearsay rule to proffered evidence, and that hearsay jurisdic
tions consciously ignore the demonstrated workability of the non-hearsay
view.
The crucial distinction that courts should not ignore about computer re
cords is that some records are computer-stored while others are computer48.

Armstead, 432 So. 2d at 839-40.

49.

Duncan, 30 M.J. at 1288.

50.

Id. at 1288-89.

51.
See FED. R. Evm. 102 (setting forth accurate factfinding as one of the main purposes of
the FRE).
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52
generated. In essence, computer-stored records are human assertions
53
stored in an electronic format. These records constitute "assertions" be
cause they are "the by-product of a machine operation which uses for its
54
input 'statements' entered into the machine by out of court declarants."
Examples o f this type o f record include: word processor files; spreadsheets,
55
such as Microsoft Excel files; charts; graphs; and emails. Accordingly,
these records are "statements" and fit easily under the classic definition of
hearsay.
Computer-generated records, on the other hand, are records that are
56
"self-generated" by the computer. This is a sometimes deceptively simple
definition because human interaction often triggers the computer processes
that create the records; however, the crucial factor is whether the record is a
mark of computer activity or if it is the electronically-saved statements of a
human user. A common example of this type of record is the trace report
created by a telephone company computer when it monitors calls made to a
57
specific phone number. When a person dials that number, the computer
automatically creates the report-no human must assert that the call was
made in order for the record to be generated. Other examples include ATM
59
58
receipts, computer document "meta-data," and internet protocol ("IP")
logs on computer networks.
The former, if introduced at trial, fall under the classic definition of
hearsay while the latter can be likened to original evidence such as finger
6()
prints, sound recordings, and photographs. This distinction affects both
how the records should be analyzed for admissibility as well as the methods
61
attorneys must employ when introducing such records in the first place.
Therefore, courts must acknowledge the difference between computer
stored and computer-generated records in order to accurately judge a re
cord's admissibility.

52.

For further discussion on these two terms of

53.

Id. at 840.

54.

Id. at 839.

art,

please see Armstead, 432 So. 2d at 839-

40.

55.

Kerr, supra note 46; Computer-Generated Evidence: The Hearsay Rule and Computerized Evidence, 2 CRIM. PRAC. GUIDE 1, 1 (March 2001) [hereinafter CRIM. PRAC. GUIDE).

56.

2 McCORMICK, supra note 12, § 294; CRIM. PRAc. GUIDE, supra note 55, at I.

57.

2 McCORMICK, supra note 12, § 294.

58.

See, e. g . , United States v. Duncan, 30 M.J. 1284, 1289 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1990).

59. See, e. g. , United States v. Rollins, No. ACM34515, 2004 WL 26780, at *9-10 (A.F. Ct.
Crim. App. Dec. 24, 2003).
60.

Infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.

61.

If a piece of evidence is not deemed hearsay under FED. R. EvID. 801, then the analyses

for admitting it at trial fall on authentication, FED. R. EvID. 901, and the evidence's probative versus
prejudicial value, FED. R. EvID. 403. If both of these qualifications are proven satisfactory to the
judge, then the proffered evidence should be admitted. Importantly, even admissible hearsay must
undergo these two steps. Therefore, the consequence of this distinction is that non-hearsay computer
records do not have to undergo an additional step for being admitted at trial.
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Almost all federal courts, and most state courts, doggedly ignore this
distinction, maintaining a "hearsay conception" of all computer-generated
records. While this hearsay conception appropriately recognizes that there
are situations where computer evidence constitutes out-of-court assertions,
62
opponents believe this view is oversimplified. These same opponents aver
that there are several powerful reasons to distinguish between the two types
of records, and this is why the hearsay conception cannot be accepted by
itself.
II.

C OMPUTER-GENERATED RECORDS S HOULD
NOT BE CONSIDERED HEARSAY

Not only is the distinction between computer-stored and computer
generated records possible, it is supported by the language and purpose of
the hearsay rules and vital to promote the policies of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. This Section details the reasons for the non-hearsay view and ar
gues that they are more persuasive than their hearsay counterparts.
First, the plain language of the hearsay rule suggests that computer
generated records cannot be considered hearsay because they are not made
65
63
64
by a "person" and cannot be "statements" for the purposes of the rule.
Most courts have historically excluded from the hearsay rule "statements"
made by animals and machines because the nature of their creation does not
66
It is not clear why computer-generated records

suggest any unreliability.

should be treated any differently.

State

v.

67
Armstead, the hallmark case of this non-hearsay view, appro

priately recognizes this fact and uses it in making the distinction between

62. Orin Kerr, previously of the Department of Justice's Computer Crime and Intellectual
Property Section, argues that, as federal courts develop a more "nuanced" view on computer re
cords, they will be able to see distinctions inherent in the evidentiary issues presented by the various
types of record. Kerr, supra note 46, at 26. This ability to distinguish records, though, is not cur
rently present in the way federal courts analyze computer records on the whole.

63.

Federal Rule of Evidence 801(b) states, "A 'declarant' is a person who makes a state

ment." FED. R. Evm. 80l(b) (emphasis added). Rule 80l(c) then goes on to say, " 'Hearsay' is a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. Evm. 80l(c). The Oxford English Dic
tionary defines a "person" as "a human being regarded as an individual." CONCISE OXFORD
DICTIONARY 1065 (10th ed. 2002). While far from a legal source, this dictionary's definitions are
nonetheless taken as persuasive in U.S. courts. See, e. g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125,
128 (1998).Generally, cases in the U.S. that have dealt with the issue of defining the term "person"
were brought in order to incorporate either political or corporate bodies into the overarching defini
tion, or were meant to clarify the term for tax purposes. See, e.g., Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S.
182, 190 (1990) (compiling a history of various definitions of the corporate "person").

64.

See F ED . R. Evm. 801(a) (defining the term "statement").

65.

See, e. g., United States v. Duncan, 30 M.J. 1284, 1288 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1990).

66.

LEMPERT ET AL., supra note 12, at 522. Besides the fact that these types of "statement"

are not made by a person, the typical reason that courts have excluded animal or machine statements
from a hearsay analysis is because they are non-assertive. See id. at 517.

67.

432 So. 2d 837 (La. 1983).
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68
computer-stored and computer-generated records. In that case, instead of
entertaining the defendant's claims that prosecutors failed to satisfy the
business records exception, the court stated that the automatically generated
69
telephone call logs at issue were not human statements of any kind. After
noting that computer-stored records are rightly treated as hearsay, the major
ity then pointed out that records that are not generated by human hands
cannot be considered a statement within the normal bounds of the hearsay
70
The underlying rationale of the rule, the court maintained, is to bar
71
statements made without an oath that cannot be cross-examined. Since

rule.

self-generated records are merely a "record of [the computer's] operations,"
72

the court reasoned that they could not be statements at all.

Several courts adopted Armstead's interpretation by officially distin
guishing between computer-stored and computer-generated records and
73
implementing the appropriate rules for each. The reasoning eventually
broadened beyond just telephone records, and many different types of com
74
Eventually,

puter-generated output soon found acceptance in state courts.

in State v. Carter, Louisiana went so far as to say that it would "defy logic"
to conclude that authenticated computer-generated records could be any
75
thing but admissible evidence.
76
Second, none of the traditional rationales for excluding hearsay apply
to computer-generated records. There is no direct testimony with higher
probative value. It is impossible to increase the accuracy of computer
generated data by putting the computer under oath, cross-examining it, or
observing its demeanor. Since computer-generated records are not state
ments,

any

worries

about accuracy

will

be

remedied

by

a

simple

authentication of the record and its contents. Furthermore, even if portions

68.

Id.

69.

Id.

70.

Id. at 839-40.

71.

Id. at 840.

72.

Id.

73.
See, e. g . , United States v. Rollins, No. ACM34515, 2004 WL 26780, *9-10 (A.F. Ct.
Crim. App. Dec. 24, 2003); People v. Hawkins, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 642-43 (Ct. App. 2002);
People v. Holowko, 486 N.E.2d 877, 897 (Ill. 1985) ("[C]omputer-generated data are different . . . .
The printouts . . . are merely the tangible result of the computer's internal operations."); State v.
Carter, 762 So. 2d 662, 678-80 (La. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Meeks, 867 S.W.2d 361, 375 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1993).
74.

See, e. g., Hawkins, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (admitting computer

access logs used to show that the defendant downloaded confidential files at certain times); People
v. Caffey, 792 N.E.2d 1163 (Ill. 2002) (permitting caller ID records into the record); Gray v. Fair
view Gen. Hosp., No. 82318, 2004 WL 527936 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2004) (allowing into
evidence self-generated CAD analyses of the plaintiff's mammogram); Ly v. State, 908 S.W.2d 598
( Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (admitting printouts of a criminal's movement outside of electronically
controlled boundaries).

text.

75.

Caner, 762 So. 2d at 678.

76.

Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 598 (1994); supra note 6 and accompanying
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the responding attorney can put

them back in context by introducing the rest of the record. Considering that
none of the rationales for the hearsay rule relate to authenticated computer
generated records, traditional justifications for excluding hearsay do not
apply.
Third, the non-hearsay view, in line with hundreds of years of Anglo
78
advocates distinctions based on the na
79
ture, trustworthiness, and probative value of each computer record at issue.
American evidentiary precedent,

This is because lumping wide categories of evidence under the hearsay rule
requires that they satisfy an exception to the rule, despite the fact that, as a
category of evidence, they may be as reliable as any other non-hearsay items
introduced at trial. Such a view is supported by both the hearsay rule's prin
cipal justifications and more recent additions to the corpus of evidentiary
80
law. Moreover, these principles accurately judge the probative weight that
computer-generated records deserve.
Since the hearsay rule is predicated on the untrustworthiness of out-of
81
the main concern is whether computer-generated records

court statements,

are trustworthy if properly authenticated. Several characteristics of these
records lead to the conclusion that, indeed, they are trustworthy and unde
serving of the hearsay label. Businesses, the government, and the average
layperson utilize computer-generated records because they are reliable, and,
more importantly, they offer an unbiased, accurate portrayal of certain ex
changes that occur between computers and humans. Computer-generated
82
records should thus be considered legally reliable because of the nature in
which they were created and because this same process eliminates any ques
tion of accuracy beyond a preliminary inquiry into the authenticity of the
records themselves.
Any inaccuracies found in computer-generated records are not the type
the hearsay rule is designed to catch. Whereas a Word document is a

77.

Williamson, 512 U.S. at 598.

78. See 2 McCORMICK, supra note 12, § 53 (outlining the history of Anglo-American juris
prudence on judicial admissibility determinations).
79.

Id.

80. American courts do not admit hearsay statements because they are inherently unreliable.
FENNER, supra note 3, at 4-5. The hearsay rule "expresses the judicial system's preference for the
real witness, rather than a witness who heard it from the real witness." Id. at 8 (citation omitted). (As
will be discussed in Section ID.A, infra, this Note's suggested "electronic fingerprints" test demon
strates why computer-generated records are, themselves, the "real witness.") Thus, probative
evidence must be adequately authenticated, see People v.Houston, 679 N.E.2d 1244, 1249 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1997), accurate, see State v. Farner, 66 S.W.3d 188 (Tenn. 2001), and easily introduced at trial,
FED. R. Evm. 401.
81. Tribe, supra note 5, at 958; cf Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543 (1986) (noting that
hearsay statements are "presumptively unreliable").
82.
Paul S. Milich, Hearsay Antinomies: The Case for Abolishing the Rule and Staning
Over, 71 OR. L. REV. 723, 745 (1992) ("Even before the hearsay rule was fully established, courts
began finding specific situations in which hearsay should be admitted."); see also FENNER, supra
note 3, at 135 (stating the traditional view that hearsay exceptions are for those types of hearsay
statements that society at large deems unusually reliable).
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mechanism for recording assertions made by a person, a computer
generated record, much like a photograph or sound recording, merely cap
83

tures information about the state of the world at a particular moment.

Although these records may be inaccurate or misleading, as noted by Judge
Van Graafeiland in Penna Research, the inaccuracies are best caught by the
84
authentication process, rather than by cross-examining the computer itself.
Since the ultimate concern in admitting these types of evidence is authenti
85
computer-generated records warrant the same treatment.

cation,

Fourth, classifying computer-generated records as hearsay may often
86
for computer

frustrate the purpose of promoting accurate fact finding

crimes like electronic terrorism, internet stalking, computer trespass, and
electronic spoliation because it may prohibit highly relevant and trustworthy
87
evidence regarding the crime. While this is a justification based more on
policy considerations than it is based on the hearsay rule or evidentiary
rules, it suggests that the hearsay rule's justifications may be outweighed by
countervailing interests. Furthermore, this rationale exhibits why it is so
important to correctly classify computer-generated and computer-stored
88
records: computers are used more and more in business and at trial; evi
dentiary rules must keep pace.
Finally, the core of the hearsay position is based on an outdated concep
tion of computers and the nature of the records they create, and the minority
position is not. Penna Research was decided in 1976, and the majority of

83.
See United States v. Rembert, 863 F.2d 1023, 1026-28 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (admitting pho
tographs as valid reliable "silent witness[es]"); United States v. Slade, 627 F.2d 293, 301 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (holding sound recordings admissible evidence because they were reliable and relevant to the
defendant's guilt); United States v. McMillan, 508 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1974); People v. Bowley, 31
Cal. Rptr. 471, 476 (Cal. 1963).
84.

FED. R. Evrn. 901 advisory committee's note.

85. FED. R. Evrn. 90l(a); CRIM. PRAc. GUIDE, supra note 55, at l; cf United States v. Simp
son, 152 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that authentication of properly admissible
computer records depends on the functioning of the program or process in question).
86.
See Tribe, supra note 5, at 958 (noting that the reason hearsay evidence is excluded is
because it impedes, rather than helps, factfinding).
87.
The elements of each crime cited obviously rely heavily on computer evidence. For
example, in a case for computer trespass, 28 U.S.C. § 2701 (a) makes it illegal to access stored elec
tronic communications if the user is either (1) unauthorized to do so, or (2) exceeds their
authorization to do so. To extend the example, let us assume the victim in this suit is a business. 28
U.S.C. § 270l(a) (2000) . If the business is unable to provide the records of the unauthorized access
for any reason (such as deletion, corruption, or other destruction of the records), the only recourse
may be to utilize records from the accused's computer itself. Since these records are not business
records and are unlikely to fall under any other hearsay exceptions such as admissions, FED. R.
Evrn. 80l (d). Similarly, in other cases like computer fraud, 18 U.S.C. § l 030(a)(4) (2000), or extor
tionate threats, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(7) (2000), private individuals or businesses that do not have the
proper records are likely unable to bring an adequate suit minus the ability to introduce the defen
dant's own computer records.
88.
L. Neal Ellis, Jr. et al ., Recent Developments in Trial Techniques, 35 TORT & INS. L.J.
677, 695 (2000); Paul W. Grimm & Claudia Diamond, Low-Tech Solutions to High-Tech Wizanfry:
Computer-Generated Evidence, 37 MD. B.J. 5, 6 (2004); Gary A. Munneke, Legal Skills For A
Transforming Profession, 22 PACE L. REV. 105, 128 n.129 (2001).
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89
subsequent foundational decisions were handed down twenty years ago.
90
Hearsay courts have not seen fit to question or reexamine these precedents.
This is not to say that these results are wrong. In fact, Penna Research and
its progeny aptly recognize the danger of believing that all computer records
are admissible and free from hearsay. The current hearsay conception, how
ever, is based on a notion of computers that does not account for
independent activity and recordkeeping, which are often free from any hu
91
man interaction. Simply delineating between the two types of records
would allow these courts to keep their current precedent, but also include a
view of computer records that rightly foregoes a hearsay analysis for trust
worthy,

reliable

pieces

of

evidence

contained

in computer-generated

records.
By contrast, the hearsay view is implicitly rationalized on the premises
92
the judicial

that uniformity in treatment of computer records is desirable,

process must be efficient, and computer records are ambiguously indefin
93
able. While these rationales technically provide the basis for a more
smoothly-functioning judicial system as a whole, they are overridden in this
case by the need for accurate factfinding and a consistent hearsay rule. The
hearsay viewpoint's policy justifications simply cannot excuse the incorrect
assumption that computer-generated records invariably constitute hearsay,
especially when such records are highly probative and useful in ascertaining
the truth.
A different source of the steadfast adherence to the business and public
records exceptions might be the wording of the Rules of Evidence them
selves. Both exceptions incorporate the words "data compilation[s]" into
94
and almost all commentators take this to be synonymous
95
with "computer records." The hearsay view, however, seems to ignore that

their definitions,

89. See, e. g., United States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Glasser,
773 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir. 1985).
90. See, e. g. , United States v. Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1306, 1317 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing
Glasser, 773 F.2d at 1557-58); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Lozen Int'I, LLC, 285 F.3d 808, 819 (9th Cir.
2002) (citing Miller, 771 F.2d at 1237); United States v. Williams, 264 F.3d 561, 568 (5th Cir. 2001)
(citing Miller, 771 F.2d at 1228); United States v. Stoudenmire, 74 F.3d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1996) (cit
ing Glasser, 773 F.2d at 1557).
91.

See cases cited supra note 83 and accompanying text.

92. See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921) (noting
that a judicial system can only do society's work if it practices a certain level of stare decisis be
cause to do otherwise is to make law an uncertain and arbitrary practice); Carl Tobias, A Divisional
Arrangementfor the Federal Appeals Courts, 43 ARJZ. L. REV. 633, 656 (2001).
93. See Roberts, supra note 38, at 279 (discussing the inherent dangerousness computer
evidence entails because it can combine hearsay and other inadmissible or erroneous data into an
attractive evidentiary "package").
94. FED. R. Evm. 803(6) ("A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form
. . ."); FED. R. Evm. 803(8) ("Records. reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form . . .").
95.
See CRJM. PRAc. GUIDE, supra note 55; see also United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476,
1494 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that it is "well established that computer data compilations are admis
sible as business records under [FRE] 803(6)"); United States v. Hutson, 821 F.2d 1015, 1019 (5th
Cir. 1987) ("Computer records are admissible if the requirements of Rule 803(6) have been met.").
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this language does not mean computer records can only be admitted under
these hearsay exceptions. The threshold question for applying FRE 803(6),
96
It seems that

after all, is whether the evidence in question is even hearsay.

courts get distracted by the fact that computer-generated records are printed
97
despite the fact that

on paper and look similar to human-created records,

the nature of their creation and content create an inference of trustworthi
ness strong enough to avoid a hearsay classification.
The only reason computers are viewed so distrustfully is because they
can contain hearsay statements in "packaging" that otherwise looks like

98
admissible evidence. A means to distinguish between hearsay and non
99
hearsay computer records would easily resolve this concem. In practice,

drawing lines between these two types of record is not overly difficult. All
that is needed is an approach that facilitates understanding of this important
distinction.
III. A PROPOSED METHOD TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN
COMPUTER-STORED AND COMPUTER-GENERATED RECORDS:

THE "ELECTRONIC FINGERPRINTS" TEST
As established above, a gray area exists between computer-stored and
computer-generated records, and it often confuses judges and attorneys

1

alike. 00 As with many types of evidence, computer records may be classified
differently depending on one's point of view. If the court analyzes each por
tion of a computer record, some parts may be considered computer
generated and consequently admissible under the various hearsay and evi
dence rules. For example, if a prosecutor hopes to admit a document found
on a defendant's computer, the question becomes, must the file's metadata-

96. FED. R. Evm. 803 (''The following [types of hearsay] are not excluded by the hearsay
rule . . .") (list omitted).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 7 7 1 F.2d 1 2 1 9, 1237 (9th Cir. 1985) (calling computer
records "writings" and stating that they will be admitted only if they satisfy the business records
exception).
98.

Id.

99.

See infra, Part Ill .

100. Many hearsay jurisdiction cases properly identify records as computer-generated, yet
then apply the hearsay rule and undertake a business records analysis. See United States v. Cestnik,
36 F.3d 904, 909 (10th Cir. 1 994) (holding computer-generated records admissible because they
were used to show the amount and origin of fraudulent bank transfers and because they satisfied the
business records exception); United States v. Linn, 880 F.2d 209, 2 1 6 (9th Cir. 1 989) ("The record
was generated automatically . . . as records of outgoing telephone calls regularly are . . . . In any
event, telephone records are business records for the purposes of [FRE] 803(6)."); United States v.
Miller, 771 F.2d 1 2 1 9, 1237 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that computer-generated records are potential
hearsay because they constitute "writings"); United States v. Glasser, 773 F.2d 1 553, 1 559 ( 1 1 th Cir.
1985) (setting out the various situations where computer-generated records are admissible, and all of
these situations are the traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule); United States v. Fusero, 106 F.
Supp. 2d 92 1 , 924-25 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (allowing computer-generated records into the record
because they were kept in the ordinary course of business).
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101
computer-generated, invisible "headers" of most computer files -be in
admissible simply because the type of document itself is computer-stored
data and, therefore, hearsay? If so, and records are viewed as wholes rather
than as their constituent parts, they may be deemed inadmissible as a re
sult.

io2

Under current precedent, jurists are frequently unable to distinguish be
tween the two types of computer records because there is no test on which
103
to base an accurate analysis. A unified method for distinguishing com
puter-stored

from

computer-generated

records

would

resolve

this

controversy. Without such a test, computer records, or parts thereof, that are
logically admissible but do not satisfy a hearsay exception will be denied
because they are improperly considered out-of-court statements under out
dated notions of the nature of computers and hearsay itself.
In order to facilitate the recognition of the distinction between com
puter-stored and computer-generated records and to aid judges in the
admission process of each type of record, this Part argues that courts should
adopt a conception of computer records wherein records similar to "finger
prints" are considered admissible as original pieces of evidence. Section
III.A outlines this "electronic fingerprints" test and describes how it may be
used. Section 111.B then notes potential obstacles to implementing the non
hearsay view and electronic fingerprints test, and it offers ways in which the
transition can best be accomplished.
A. The "Electronic Fingerprints " Test
The "electronic fingerprints" test is premised on the distinction between
computer-stored and computer-generated records, and it outlines an ap
proach to help judges understand the nature of various computer records,
which is especially useful when delineating between records that have ele
ments of both classifications. Computer-generated records are likened to
fingerprints in this test because of the way that they record the data in ques
104
This approach finds support in recent case law and academic

tion.

JOI.

ALAN M. GAHTAN, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE 7 (1999).

Cf United States v. Blackbum, 992 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that an other
102.
wise valid computer-generated report was inadmissible because it was prepared for litigation rather
than "in the course of regularly conducted business activity"); see also, People v. Chandler, No.
178600, 1996 WL 33357832, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 1996) (upholding, as harmless error,
the decision to exclude evidence that the accused's computer showed he was logged into his work
network at the time of the victim's shooting).
103.
See, e.g., United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that computer
records created by a computer itself are business records); Blackbum, 992 F.2d at 670 (finding a
computer-generated report inadmissible because it "was not kept in the course of a regularly con
ducted business activity"); United States v. Glasser, 773 F.2d 1553 (I lth Cir. 1985) (holding that
computer-generated records created for litigation are inadmissible because they are hearsay and
similarly unable to be authenticated).
104. Fingerprints are used as evidence because of their ability to accurately demonstrate a
physical record of a human hand. Ed German, The History of Fingerprints, at http://
onin.com/fp/fphistory.html (last updated May 8, 2005). Furthermore, they are often some of the
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105
thought, and it offers a lens through which courts may finally define the
true nature of computer-generated output. Most importantly, however, the
test presents an effective delineation process for courts, thereby helping
them to avoid the illogical underpinnings that so plague current majority
precedent on the subject.
The approach proceeds as follows. First, when computer records are in
troduced, a judge must ask if the purpose of the records is to establish the
existence of a transaction by a mechanical or digital object, whether a com
puter, an ATM card, a telephone number, or some other tangible object. This
is a threshold question based on judicial economy; it is easy to answer and
gives an accurate view of the record's likely admissibility in one broad
swath. If, for example, a prosecutor wishes to introduce an IP log in order to
demonstrate that the defendant's computer signed on a network at specified
times, this is presented in order to identify the computer conducting perti
nent activity on an internet network; therefore, the records are relevant
based on identification purposes.
Second, the judge must decide whether the piece of computer evidence
constitutes an "electronic fingerprint" or, instead, an out-of-court statement.
In order to accomplish this goal, the judge must evaluate the nature of the
offered record itself. Specifically, the judge must ask if the record is an as
106
sertion or the preservation of an electronic transaction. If the record is the
result of a computer's sole operation, the purpose must be the presentation
107
of the transaction in question. If there was human interaction, what was

most probative evidence offered at trial. See, e. g. , K.S. v. State, 8 1 4 So. 2d 1 190, 1 192 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2002) (stating that it is possible for prosecutors to rely solely on fingerprint evidence when
establishing a defendant's guilt); Browning v. State, 91 P.3d 39, 42 (Nev. 2004) ("[D]efendant's guilt
was overwhelming given that his fingerprints were at the crime scene . . . ."); People v. McKenzie,
768 N.Y.S.2d 8 1 6, 8 1 7 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) ("Moreover, the fingerprint evidence, standing alone,
established defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"). Therefore, considerable weight is given
to these pieces of evidence. Id.
105. This concept of "electronic fingerprints" is not new; indeed, many commentators-both
judicial and academic-already use the term to describe the remnants of a computer transaction. See
Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1 1 32, 1 146 (9th Cir. 1 999) ("Moreover, when we em
ploy electronic methods of communication we often leave electronic 'fingerprints' behind . . . that
can be traced back to us."); Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the F uture: Coping With Discovery of
Electronic Material, 64 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 253, 264 (200 1 ) ("As an initial matter, it would
seem that these electronic 'fingerprints' should be no more immune to discovery than any other
material that might be useful in making accurate determinations."); Robert H. McKirgan & Randy
Papetti, Cheating in the 21st Century, Lrrm., Summer 2001 , at 49, 52 ("Unlike paper files, elec
tronic files even when deleted often leave 'electronic fingerprints' that could reveal when the files
were deleted.").
106. See FED. R. Evm. 80l (c); United States v. Breland, 356 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 2004);
McEuin v. Crown Equip. Corp., 328 F.3d 1028, 1038 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sallins, 993
F.2d 344, 346 (3rd Cir. 1993); United States v. Rodriguez-Pando, 841 F.2d 10 14, 1 020 (10th Cir.
1988).
107. See United States v. Rollins, No. ACM345 15, 2004 WL 26780, at *9 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. Dec. 24, 2003) (denying the assertion that computer-generated records are hearsay because
they are created independently of any human interaction).
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the assertive quality of the interaction that created the record?

108

Essentially,

this analysis is used to determine whether the record is an assertion or if it is
the equivalent to the mark left behind when a person holds a tactile object. A
hearsay analysis is only appropriate in the former case.
The cumulative result would be:

(1)

a threshold, traditionally judicial

question, which-if answered "yes"-leads to;

(2)

a more searching techni

cal question. If the answers tend toward less interaction or assertive intent,
then the record should be classified as "computer-generated" and escape the
hearsay label. If they tend toward assertive conduct-generally where there
is significant human interaction-then they should be deemed "computer
stored" and go through general computer-related hearsay precedent set for
ward in federal cases. For example, if a prosecutor offers the defendant's
online journal wherein the defendant admits that he signed on to a network
at specified times, this obviously deals with human assertions, and, as a re
sult, the court should apply a normal hearsay analysis.
Important to the "electronic fingerprints" approach is that judges ana
lyze the specific part of the record being introduced as evidence under the
previous two steps. This allows attorneys to break down the record into its
constituent parts, which are usually a combination of computer-stored and
109
For example, most computer-stored records
110
such as Microsoft files and Photoshop images contain metadata, which
computer-generated data.

can be computer-generated. This metadata records a wide variety of data,
such as when the file was last opened or modified, the user who accessed
the file, the computer used, and any actions taken with respect to the file
(such as printing or emailing it to another computer). A similar example is
online journals, which contain both types of data combined into one. The
site's user-created content may be rightfully excluded while the computer
generated logs of the website itself are admitted into the record. Because of
computer evidence's highly unified presentation, judges and lawyers alike

108. See United States v. Duncan, 30 M.J. 1284, 1 288-89 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1990) (find
ing that records of keystrokes or computer-tracked information are not hearsay because the human
interaction required to make such records is at a minimal level and is not assertive).
109. Interestingly enough, metadata has become a problem for some businesses because it
often contains sensitive information that can be retrieved by electronic recipients of the file. An
especially striking example recently involved England's Prime Minister, Tony Blair who unwittingly
turned over Microsoft Word documents that contained sensitive information in their metadata. Rich
ard M. Smith, Microsoft Wont bytes Tony Blair in the butt, at http://www.computerbytesman.com/
privacy/blair.htm (June 23, 2003). This data is also very important for normal Internet operation. For
a discussion of metadata's purpose and definition with respect to Internet documents, see Warwick
Cathro, Metadata: An Overview (August 1997), available at http://www.nla.gov.au/nla/staffpaper/
cathro3.html (last updated Sept. 10, 1 997).
1 10. See Staff, AntiOnline Spotlight: Microsoft Metadata Forensics, ENTERPRISE IT PLANET,
Mar. 1 1 , 2004, at http://www.enterpriseitplanet.com/security/features/article.php/3324701 (discuss
ing the functions and prevalence of metadata in Microsoft files); Adobe, Search results
for "metadata," at http://busca.adobe.com/search?site=AdobeCom&client=AdobeCom&filter=O&
output=xml_no_dtd&proxystylesheet=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.adobe.com%2Fspecial%2Fsearch%2
Fadobecomsupport.xsl&restrict=Adobe_com_Train&q=metadata&x=O&y=O (last visited Aug. 1 1 ,
2005).
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can miss the crucial distinctions that make parts of the evidence admissible
'''

and other parts barred under the FRE and various court precedents.

Finally, in the interests o f creating as unified a n approach a s possible,
the last step in this proposed approach is to err on the side of caution. If the
answers to the questions posited above offer no clear determination of the
records' classification, then judges should simply deem the record "com
puter-stored " and conduct regular hearsay analysis. In this narrow class of
cases, courts should rely on the hearsay exceptions.
An example of the test's utility is found when various types of computer
112

records are offered, much like fingerprints, to establish personal identity.

Typical examples of this in use are ATM records, phone records, computer
113
metadata, and IP logs. The common characteristic running through all of
these instances is that they are used to identify the point of origin for an
electronic transaction and do not reflect a human assertion. For example,
phone company records demonstrate the incoming and receiving phone
114
IP logs display incoming computer

numbers of a telephone conversation;

signals and how an internet server organizes the flow of data to those com
115
and ATM records set down the ATM card used and the time and

puters;

place of the transaction. Therefore, just as real fingerprints are the physical
record of fingers touching objects, computer-generated records are the elec
tronic record of computers or human users electronically "touching" other
116
computers.
The test thus relies on the premise that content, rather than form, should
117
rule. Furthermore, if an "electronic fingerprints" analysis deems the re
cords to be computer-generated, then the only true question left over is
whether they can also be authenticated. If so, and if there are no other valid
objections to the evidence, then they should be admissible at trial.
The "electronic fingerprints" approach delineates the often confusing
distinction between computer-stored and computer-generated records while
still allowing truly ambiguous cases to be analyzed under a customary hear
say

approach.

Thus,

under

the

test,

courts

retain

their

traditional

1 1 1 . See FED. R. Evm. 105; Potamkin Cadillac Corp. v. B.R.I. Coverage Corp., 38 F.3d 627,
632 (2d Cir. 1994) ("A business record may include data stored electronically on computers and
later printed out for presentation in court, so long as the 'original computer data compilation was
prepared pursuant to a business duty in accordance with regular business practice.' ") (quoting
United States v. Hernandez, 9 1 3 F.2d 1 506, 1 5 1 2 (10th Cir. 1 990)).
1 1 2.
Stevenson v. United States 380 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1967); cf. State v. Dunn, 7 S.W.3d
427 (Mo. Ct. App. 1 999) (wherein computer-generated telephone records were used to identify the
house of origin for certain phone calls).
1 1 3.

Kerr, supra note 46, at 26.

1 1 4.

See, e.g., Dunn, 7 S.W.3d at 432.

1 1 5.

See, e.g., United States v. Wagers, 339 F. Supp. 2d 934, 938 (E.D. Ky. 2004).

1 1 6.

Roberts, supra note 38.

1 1 7.

See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
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8
discretionary power with respect to questions of admissibility, 1 1 but also

have an appropriate standard for determining admissibility at trial and judg

ing plain error or erroneous rulings on computer evidence during appellate

review. This standard will also provide guidance in an area which desper
ately needs cohesive thinking.

B. Addressing Potential P roblems with Reforming Current Majority
P recedent-Adjusting to the Electronic Fingerprints Test
Practically speaking, the question remains whether majority courts are

willing to adapt to the non-hearsay view. While there are obstacles to this

transition, none present such a barrier as to wholly prevent hearsay courts
from changing their precedent. Any transition will necessarily be piecemeal,

but this is certainly attainable despite any problems presented by current
precedent and practice.

One major obstacle to reforming the hearsay position is that, even if

judges are convinced to switch to the non-hearsay view, they may be leery
of tampering with current precedent because they are unable to tell the dif

ference between hearsay and non-hearsay computer records. This is not an

overly distressing problem. Most notably, this is because it is a judge's job
9
to make fine distinctions on evidence's admissibility. 1 1 The way to do this

job and avoid the understandable fear stated above is to educate oneself on
the nature of the evidence being introduced. To facilitate this process, trial

judges should adopt the electronic fingerprints approach when analyzing
computer records.

The second obstacle to reforming the hearsay position is the view that

says, "If it ain't broke, don' t fix it." It is true that, with valid authentication,
0
most business records and public records will be admitted at trial. 1 2 More

over, there are several other ways for most pieces of computer evidence to
be admitted into evidence even if they are theoretically hearsay. 1 2 1 Regard
less, computer-generated records should still be analyzed as non-hearsay
evidence.

1 1 8.
See FED. R. Evm 104(a) (detailing trial courts' extremely broad discretion to determine
evidence's admissibility).
1 19.
See FED. R. Evm. 1 04(a) (giving broad powers to judges when determining evidence's
admissibility).
1 20.

See FED. R. Evm. 803(6), 803(8).

See Westfed Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 5 5 Fed. 0 . 544, 566 (Fed. Cl. 2003) (aJmit
ting the possibility that emails may be admissible as present-sense impressions if they are shown to
be authentic and contemporaneous); Vermont Elec. Power Co. v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection
121.

& Ins. Co., 72 F. Supp. 2d 441 , 449 (D. Vt. 1999) (holding that a party's emails are admissions for
the purposes of the hearsay rule); People v. Bynum, 629 N.E.2d 724, 73 1-32 (Ill. App. Ct. 1 994)
(stating that computer graphs printed for trial by an expert witness were admissible as materials

normally used by experts despite their status as hearsay); Kitterman v. Mich. Educ. Employees Mut.
Ins. Co., No. 247428, 2004 WL 1459523, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. June 29, 2004) (assuming that email
correspondences of the defendant were admissible as recorded collections).
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First, the current rule may mask the amount of computer evidence actu

ally excluded. As some commentators point out, many pieces of potential

hearsay evidence are not even introduced at trial because the proponent par
ties suspect they will be denied. 1 22 Thus, while most computer records are
admitted at trial, this is likely a case of correlation, not causation. Put differ

ently, attorneys are likely to only introduce computer records that they know
will be admissible; to do otherwise would be to risk their credibility in front

of the judge and jury and, consequently, potentially jeopardize their client's

case. The status quo is therefore less convincing if argued solely on the ap
proach' s seeming functionality.

Second, the system is, in fact, broken. Computer-generated records sim
ply cannot be hearsay, and the antiquated, stare decis is -fueled hearsay
viewpoint refuses to recognize this fact. Courts regularly make fine distinc

tions on what is hearsay and what is not. 1 23 In order to continue this

tradition, hearsay courts must make the effort to move beyond an imperfect
logical basis for their evidentiary decisions.

These arguments demonstrate why it is baffling that hearsay courts have

maintained the hearsay position for so long. Besides being internally incon
sistent with several other important hearsay decisions, 1 24 the hearsay stance

discredits

the validity of evidence that is extremely probative, non

prejudicial, and reliable. The challenge that faces these courts is how to
overcome inertia and arrive at a more coherent and logical position with

respect to computer-generated records.

CONCLUSION

Reformation of the hearsay view will most likely be accomplished

through small steps, the first of which is to simply establish a compelling

reason for altering current practice. As this Note demonstrates, there are

ample bases and reasons for federal-and similarly-aligned state--courts to

correct decades of erroneous legal precedent.

Legal precedent must keep pace with technology. Computers play an in

creasingly large part at trial with each passing year. 1 25 This is so especially

because computer-generated evidence is employed in a myriad of situations

1 22.

See, e. g., LEMPERT ET AL., supra note 1 2, at 534 n.4 1 .

1 23.
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 1 02, 1 1 8-20 ( 1 965) (discussing whether a piece of
evidence at trial was a personal observation, hearsay, or "hearsay on hearsay"); Adkins v. Brett, 193
P. 25 1 , 252-53 (Cal. 1 920) (recognizing that admissible declarations of mental state may nonethe
less contain inadmissible hearsay recitals of fact); Breedlove v. State, 4 1 3 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. 1982)
("Merely because a statement is not admissible for one purpose does not mean it is inadmissible for
another purpose.").
1 24.
( 1 933).

See, e. g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999); Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96

1 25.

See Frank Tuerkheimer, The Daubert Case and Its Aftermath: A Shot-Gun Wedding of

Technology and Law in the Supreme Coun, 5 1 SYRACUSE L. REV. 803, 804-05 (2001 ).
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1 6
that go well beyond simple business disputes. 2 Judges must therefore deal
with the introduction of computer-stored and computer-generated evidence
with ever-increasing frequency.

As society relies more and more on computers, it necessarily becomes
.
.
1 8
1
more teeh -savvy. 1 2 s·mu·1 ar1y, so do its JUdges. 2 w·th
i
approac hes sueh as

the electronic fingerprints test as well as judges' own experiences in a com
puter-filled society, understanding of what various pieces of computer

evidence represent will flourish and lead to a more nuanced and ultimately

correct process for admitting computer evidence at trial.

For the reasons discussed above, courts cannot go on simply assuming

that all computer records are hearsay. Computer-generated records' methods

of creation, purposes, and uses at trial all point to the conclusion that they
simply are not human statements of any kind. In light of this fact, the ques

tion becomes where courts should go from here. An immediate transition to

the non-hearsay viewpoint, facilitated by the electronic fingerprints test, is

suggested. Barring this miraculous change in position, however, as previ

ously stated, the least courts should do is reexamine the basis for their

conclusions and move beyond the outdated Perrna Research decision.

It may well be that courts differ on which computer-generated records

are not hearsay and which constitute a human statement of one form or an
other. Such is a legal fact of life. However, if the hearsay versus non-hearsay

analysis is present, then these courts will have made a step in the right direc-

1 26. GAHTAN, supra note 1 0 1 , at 2. For example, computer evidence has been used, among
other reasons, to substantiate allegations of sexual harassment, Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1 327 (7th
Cir. 1996), prove theft of trade secrets, First Tech. Safety Sys., Inc. v. Depinet, 1 1 F.3d 64 1 (6th Cir.
1 993), verify the improper use of licensed software, Lauren Corp. v. Century Geophysical Corp.,
953 P.2d 200 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998), and substantiate a wrnngful termination of employment, Kelley
v. Airborne Freight Corp., 1 40 F.3d 335 ( 1 st Cir. 1 998).
1 27.

COMPUTER LAW 1 -2 (Chris Reed & John Angel eds., 4th ed. 2000) ; Marc D. Goodman,

Why the Police Don't Care About Computer Crime, 1 0 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 465, 467-72 ( 1 997)

(noting the need for tech-savvy police to respond to the increased numbers of children-and crimi
nals-who are growing up surrounded by computers); John Grady & Jane Boyd Ohlin, T he
Application of Title Ill of the ADA to Sport Web Sites, 14 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 145, 1 47-48
(2004) (recognizing the trend for sports businesses to have cutting edge web sites because more and
more sports consumers are highly cognizant of the technological realm); Dennis Kennedy, Technol
ogy Trends: Do We Stand on the Threshold of the Next Legal Killer App?, LAW PRAC. TODAY, Apr.
2004, at 5, at http://www.abanet.org/lpmllpt/articles/tch0404 l .html (discussing litigation technology
and modem attorneys' need to utilize and understand it).
128. Several judges have already taken the step of becoming more computer-savvy. Judge
Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, started a "weblog" in 2004
with economist Gary Becker. The Becker-Posner Blog, at http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/ (last
visited Aug. 1 1 , 2005). This familiarity with computers has also become evident in written opinions.
For example, in United States v. Hill, Judge Alex Kozinski stated, "As everyone who has acciden
tally erased a computer file knows, it is fairly easy to make mistakes when operating computer
equipment." 322 F. Supp. 2d 1 0 8 1 , 1 089 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (sitting by designation pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 29 1 (b)). Another such example is found in In re Search of 381 7 W. West End, First Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60621, in which the federal district court, of its own volition, suggested that a
technical expert search computer files' "metadata" for pertinent information to the case. 321 F.
Supp. 2d 953, 956 (N.D. Ill. 2004). As these cases (and Judge Posner's weblog) suggest, judges are
gaining a more than passing knowledge of computers and their inner workings with each passing
year.
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tion. Computer records are not a class of evidence with a uniform face. If a

court is able to make the logical step and recognize that various records dif

fer in nature based on their characteristics, then the purpose of both the
hearsay and the Federal Rules of Evidence will finally be realized, at least

with respect to computer records.

1 74
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